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The weight of authority would seem to indicate that notions of jurisdiction
over property and control of the res in actions in rem serve to invalidate extensions of non-resident motorist acts to executors and administrators. However, a
closer examination into the special circumstances of the non-resident motorist
acts, an awareness of the trend implicit in Morris v. Jones, as well as a review of
the whole basis for the general rule, might justify another exception. Since all
states may be expected eventually to enact provisions allowing suit against foreign executors and administrators, an awareness of the force of comity and the
particular hazard presented by the non-resident motorist should justify a decision excluding this situation from the operation of the prevailing rule barring
suit against foreign representatives. At the very least, it would seem desirable
that the courts assume jurisdiction, thus allowing courts of the states in which
property of the estate is located to decide what effect should be given the judgment, in the hope that the force of comity might prevail to permit acceptance
of these statutes.
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDING OF ALIENAGE
IN EXCLUSION PROCEEDING
q

In Ex pare Delaney' immigration authorities sought to exclude a seaman who
had served meritoriously in the United States Merchant Marine upon his return
to the United States from a tour of duty to foreign ports. The Board bf Special
Inquiry denied Delaney admission on the basis of its finding that he was an
alien without an unexpired immigration visa' or an official passport 3 in his possession. Delaney then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he
was a native-born American citizen and that his detention was, therefore, unlawful. He contended that, even if he had in fact been an alien in 1945, at the
time of his detention, his last "entry" into the United States had been in 1924
and that as a matter of law his arrival in 1945 was not an "entry" within the
meaning of Section ig(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended.4 In support of his claim of citizenship Delaney offered in evidence his parents' certificate of marriage in the United States, a delayed birth certificate in which Delaney represented himself as having been born in Brooklyn, New York, s an oral
statement that his father had told him that he (the petitioner) had been born
in America, and other testimony showing good moral character and personal
belief that he was an American citizen. He testified that he had been taken to
1 72 F. Supp. 312 (Cal., 1947).
2 54 Stat. 673 (r94o), 8 U.S.C.A. § 451 (1940).
340 Stat. 559 (1918), as amended, 41 Stat. 1217 (1921), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 223-27 (1927).
4 39 Stat. 889 (i17), 8 U.S.C.A. § iss(a) (194o).
s If the person responsible for reporting the birth is unavailable,".... then the person making application for the certified copy of the record may file such certificate of birth .... together with such sworn statements, affidavits and other evidence as the state commissioner of
health may require. The state commissioner of health shall file such certificate and issue a certified copy thereof
to said applicant ..... " N.Y. Public Health Law (McKinney, Supp. 1947)
"
C. 45, § 391
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Ireland as a child and had returned to this country in 1924 as a member of a
British merchant ship's crew. Delaney said that he had, at that time, declared
that he was a British subject because the operators of the vessel would not have
hired an American citizen. He also said that he registered under the Alien
Registration Act of i94o because he could get no record of his birth in Brooklyn,
New York, and needed either a birth certificate or record of registration as an
alien to obtain employment. 6 From 1924 to 1943, when he joined the Maritime
Service, Delaney had maintained a continuous residence in the United States.
The district court, after severely criticizing the present state of the law, reluctantly concluded that under the law Delaney had made a new "entry" from
foreign waters or territory and would, if an alien, be subject to exclusion. But
because, under the Board's finding that Delaney was an alien, the application
of the prevailing strict construction of the word "entry" would have worked a
hardship upon the petitioner, the district court set aside the Board's finding, and
on the basis of an independent examination of the evidence, found that Delaney
was a natural-born United States citizen.
This decision raises anew two problems. It demonstrates that the application
of the technical construction of the "entry" provisions of Section i9(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, may produce unjust results in the absence of judicial willingness or freedom to find exceptions. It also illustrates the
tendency of the courts to interfere with administrative decisions which seem to
the courts to have 'denied constitutionally protected personal rights.
The purpose of the Immigration Act of 1917 was to provide a basic law to accomplish the exclusion7 or deportation' of undesirable aliens-aliens of anarchistic or violent revolutionary convictions, aliens of criminal and immoral tendencies, aliens diseased in body or mind, aliens likely to become public charges,
and aliens of those races which Congress believed could not be advantageously
assimilated into the social fabric of this country. 9
In both exclusion and deportation proceedings, the judicial construction of
the word "entry," which appears in the section of the Immigration Act dealing
with deportation,"' is applied to determine whether an alien has become subject
to exclusion or deportation because of a new entry. Under this construction, an
alien coming to this country from foreign territory is said to make an "entry"
within the meaning of the Act; and upon making an entry or re-entry,he is subject to all applicable immigration restrictions, and may under them be excluded,
6

However, no original birth certificate was needed to join the Maritime Service. ......
the United States government accepted him as an American citizen, based upon his oath-of
allegiance to the United States and whatever documentary evidence of that fact he happened
to have in his possession at that time ..... " 72 F. Supp. 312, 322 (1947).
739 Stat. 875 (1917), as amended, 4o Stat. 1012 (xgi8), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 126, 137
(1940).

Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § i55(a) (i94o).
954 Cong. Rec. 205-26, 253-77, 313 (i916); Jessup, Some Phases of the Administrative and
Judicial Interpretation of the Immigration Act of 1924, 35 Yale L.J. 705 (1926).
'o39 Stat. 889 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § i55(a) ("940).
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deported or barred from citizenship." This construction of the word "entry"
was laid down by the United States Supreme Court in United States ex rel.
Claussen v. Da 2 and, with a recent qualification,3 is now firmly entrenched in
the law.'4 It has the approval of Congress in so far as that body has not changed
the "entry" provisions. The result is that if, for example, an alien visiting
Niagara goes over the border to see the Canadian falls, he may be subject to exclusion, or to deportation if he manages a re-entry into this country, even
though deportation for earlier unlawful entry has been barred by passage of
time. The Immigration Act therefore operates in some cases to accomplish results which may not have been intended.
The severity of the law in failing to make any distinction between an original
entry and a second or subsequent entry into this country was somewhat diminished by the United States Supreme Court in Delgadillo v. Carmichael.5 In
this case it was held that an alien merchant seaman who had been rescued and
taken to Cuba after his ship was torpedoed did not make a new "entry" upon his
return to the United States. But the decision goes on the narrow ground that
the alien did not go to Cuba voluntarily; he was in intercoastal trade and
would not have made a new "entry" had his voyage continued without interruption. Thus, the Day, Corsi, and Smith cases were easily distinguished on the
ground that in those cases "the alien plainly expected or planned to enter a foreign port or place."' 6 Since it can probably be shown in most instances that the
alien held in exclusion or deportation proceedings is returning or has returned
from foreign territory which he had voluntarily entered, it is doubtful whether
the construction of the Act's "entry" provisions in the Delgadillo case has
ameliorated the present state of the law.
Statutory provisions allowing the Attorney General some discretion in both
exclusion and deportation proceedings have also diminished the severity of the
law. Under these provisions the Attorney General may, in his discretion, cause
admission of aliens returning after a temporary absence, if those aliens have
been resident in the United States for seven consecutive years. 7 The Attorney
General also may, in his discretion, suspend deportation of aliens who have
It United States ex rel. Seigel v. Reimer, 23 F. Supp. 643 (N.Y., 1938), aff'd without opinion

United States ex rel. Charles Fisk v. Reimer, 97 F. 2d r02o (C.C.A. 2d, 1938); United States
ex rel. Roovers v. Kessler, go F. 2d 327 (C.C.A. 5th, 1937); Taguchi v. Carr, 62 F. 2d 307
(C.C.A. gth, 1932). But cf. Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, i58 F. 2d 878 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
12 The Court said: "The word 'entry' by its own force implies a coming from outside. The
context shows that in order that there be an entry within the meaning of the Act there must
be an arrival from some foreign port or place." 279 U.S. 398, 4o (1929).
'3 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 68 S.Ct. 10 (1947).
'4 Compare United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129 (1932); United States ex rel.
Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422 (I933).
s68 S.Ct. 10 (1947).

6Ibid.,

at

12.

'739 Stat. 878 (.9r7), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 136 (p) (1940).
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shown good moral character for the preceding five years.' 8 The suspension is
allowed only "if he [the Attorney General] finds that such deportation would
result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is
the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien," and if the alien is
not racially inadmissible or ineligible for naturalization in the United States.9
The limited discretion allowed the Attorney General can be employed to prevent hardship exclusion or deportation of aliens who meet the Act's requirements. It is apparent, however, that this discretion cannot reach all cases. Under
the statutory requirements, for example, resident Asiatic aliens, who have close
relatives who are citizens, and who may have established businesses, may still
be absolutely excluded if they make the mistake of traveling to their homeland
for a visit."0 It is submitted, therefore, that the harsh results of exclusion and deportation cases should be prevented by Congressional modification of the prevailing construction of the word "entry." If Congress believes that certain excepted classes should enjoy statutory immunity after residence for a period of
years, then it should make operation of the rule practically uniform by preventing exclusion or deportation on the technicality of "entry" when an alien
not otherwise subject to deportation returns after a temporary visit abroad.
This could be accomplished by amending the law to provide that any alien who
has resided in the United States for a minimum number of years, and who
visits a foreign place for a time short of a maximum period, shall not be deemed
to make a new entry on his return. 2'
In the instant case, in order to avert the drastic consequences of interpreting
the petitioner's return as a new "entry," the court struck down the finding of
the immigration authorities-upon which their jurisdiction to exclude depended
-and found that Delaney was a citizen. Such procedure is inconsistent with the
practice of limited judicial review previously followed in exclusion cases. The
Delaney case also exemplifies the judicial attitude toward decisions of administrative tribunals which affect personal liberty.
In past exclusion cases the courts have generally refused to disturb any administrative finding which has been fairly arrived at. United States v. JU Toy,"
like the instant case, came up on a petition for habeas corpus. In the exclusion
"854 Stat. 672 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. § i55(c) (i94o).
19Ibid.
20 It should be noted, also, that the discretion of the Attorney General does not apply to
anarchists, revolutionists, narcotics peddlers, criminals, prostitutes, or other immoral persons,
nor to the mentally and physically deficient. 54 Stat. 672 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. § i55(d) (194o).
21The objection might be made that such a change will prevent easy deportation or exclusion of some undesirable aliens through application of the technical construction of "entry."
The short answer is that Congress has, in the present law, omitted statutory limitations on deportation in all but four classifications of aliens. 39 Stat. 889 (I9M7), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ i5(a) (194o). There is an analogy to the proposed change in existing law. If an alien has
been in residence for five years, he is not compelled to take the literacy test on returning from a
foreign visit of less than six months. 39 Stat. 877 (1917), as amended, 8 U.S.C.A. § 136(o)
(1940).
-
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proceeding the immigration officials had found that the petitioner was not, as
he alleged, an American citizen. The Court said, in denying the petition, that it
disclosed no abuse of authority by the officials, and that therefore the findings
and action of the executive officers should be treated as final and conclusive. Although the board's jurisdiction to exclude the petitioner depended upon its findings of fact, attacked by the petition, that the petitioner was not a citizen, the
Court dismissed the petition without directing or reviewing new and further
evidence upon the issue of citizenship. On similar facts Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson 23 reached a like conclusion.
The court in the Delaney case dissented from the general rule, and from the
previous exclusion cases, when it substituted its own evaluation of the evidence
upon the question of Delaney's citizenship for that of the Board of Special Inquiry. The instant case did, however, conform to the practice of the courts in
reviewing deportation proceedings. In Ng Fung Ho v. White24 it was held that a

resident person who resists deportation on the ground of citizenship is entitled
to a judicial determination de novo upon the question of his citizenship, provided he can show substantial evidence to support his claim. Mr. Justice
Brandeis felt this result to be necessary in order to protect the resident from the
loss "of all that makes life worth living" by a purely executive order. 2s His position was that the guarantee of due process in the Fifth Amendment required
judicial determination of the jurisdictional fact of citizenship, even though the
26
administrative finding upon that issue was made after fair hearings.
Formerly courts sometimes made independent determinations of "jurisdictional facts" in cases involving property rights.27 The due process clause and the

doctrine of separation of powers were employed to justify the practice. In St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States5 the Court expressed this opinion:
.... to say that their [legislative agencies'] findings of fact may be conclusive where
constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved, although the evidence clear23 273 U.S. 352 (1927).

24 259 U.S. 276 (1922).

25

Ibid., at 284.

"Where the so-called jurisdictional fact of citizenship is not involved, a fair hearing before
the administrative agency will satisfy the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment even
though the fact in issue is an essential of the power to deport. United States exrel. Tisi v. Tod,
264 U.S. 131, 133

(1924);

O'Connell ex rel. Kwong Han Foo v. Ward,

126

F. 2d 6i 5 (C.C.A.

ist, 1942).
27

Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough 253 U.S. 287

(1920);

Crowell v. Benson,

285 U.S. 22 (1932). But cf. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940).

There is an interesting application of the doctrine of separation of powers in Laisne v. State
Board of Optometry, x9 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P. 2d 457 (1942). The court said appellant's right to
practice optometry was a "vested property right," and that it was not within the power of
the legislature to vest in any other body any general judicial power to establish the right and
title to private property. If the court in mandate proceedings were limited to the evidence
presented before the board, then the board would be exercising complete judicial power
reserved to the courts.
" 298 U.S. 38 (1936). In Mr.Justice Brandeis' opinion, courts should make independent
determinations of jurisdictional facts where personal liberty is at stake, although "when
dealing with property a much more liberal rule applies." Ibid., at 77.
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ly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been invaded,
is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair
the security inherent in our judicial safeguards. That prospect, with our multiplication
of administrative agencies, is one not to be lightly regarded ..... Under our system
there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent court can be
circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to give effect to administrative
action going beyond the limits of constitutional authority.29
But the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine30 of this and other cases came under immediate attack3' and has been subject to the attrition of later decisions.32 The
usual practice now is to hold all findings of fact by administrative tribunals condusive if they are made after fair hearing and if they do not appear to be arbitrary. This practice is based on the belief that efficient administration of the
laws and adequate protection of constitutional rights are both assured if courts
accept findings of fact as final if they are supported by "substantial evidence."33
The "jurisdictional fact" doctrine continues, however, to figure in the decision of cases involving personal liberty. Recently, in Estep v. United Staes,34 it
was held that a person prosecuted for evasion of the Selective Training and
Service Act of i94o could assert the defense that his draft board had not classified him correctly. In holding the classification reviewable de novo, the court
said that "the question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached .... if there
is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant." Of course,
according to the Court's reasoning, whether or not the local board had exceeded
its jurisdiction by classifying the defendant i-A could only be decided by an independent judicial determination of the correctness of the defendant's classification. If he had not been correctly classified, the local board had exceeded its
jurisdiction and its action was void. The fact that Congress had stated that the
findings of the local board should be "final" did not affect the decision because
29 Ibid.,

at 52.
called the "doctrine of constitutional fact" because it applies to constitutional
limitations on administrative jurisdiction as distinguished from the doctrine of jurisdictional
fact, which applies to statutory limitations. But whether the doctrine be expressed by one concept or the other, the result of its application is judicial determination of basic issues. Dickinson,
Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," So U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1055 (1932).
30 Sometimes

31Ibid.; Oppenheimer, The Supreme Court and Administrative Law, 37 Col. L. Rev. 1, 36
(1937); 3o Mich. L. Rev. 1312 (1932); 32 Col. L. Rev. 738 (1932); 4i Yale L.J. 1037 (1932);

46 Harv. L. Rev. 478 (1933), noting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
32 Compare National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 1I1, 130
(i944); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (I940. In the latter case findings of law as well as fact
were held conclusive. This goes further than most cases. Ibid., at 411-13. Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 3i1 U.S. 570 (i94i); Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940), amended per curiam, 311 U.S. 614 (1940),
rehearing den. 311 U.S. 727 (i94o); Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U.S.
282 (1934); Lloyd Sabaudo SocietA Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Stork
Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E. 2d 247 (1940).
'3

Cases cited note 32 supra.

34 327 U.S. 114 (z946).
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the Court held that the findings of the local boards were final only "within their
respective jurisdictions.35
Therefore, the court in the Delaney case, in treating it as if it were a deportation case, followed the Supreme Court's general treatment of administrative
decisions which-affect personal liberty. The court thereby also established a
precedent for a uniform rule of judicial review in both exclusion and deportation cases, although previous authorities have applied the "substantial evidence" rule to exclusion proceedings and the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact"
to deportation proceedings. Deportation and exclusion proceedings seem essentially similar; under slightly different circumstances Delaney would have accomplished an "entry" and have been entitled in a deportation proceeding to
the scope of judicial review he actually received in the instant case. Application of a uniform rule of judicial review to these closely similar matters thus
seems clearly desirable.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of judicial review of "jurisdictional facts" should
not be endorsed simply because it may be a means of achieving uniformity. Application of this doctrine in deportation and exclusion cases would ignore the
purpose for which the Boards of Special Inquiry were created. There seems to be
no apparent reason why their determination of the issue of citizenship, when
citizenship is claimed as a reason for admission, should be any less conclusive
than their determination of other facts. If an administrative agency's action
cannot be shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable, its determination of all facts
should be upheld by the courts.36 Deprivation of personal liberty without due
process of law by an administrative agency need not be feared so long as the
usual scope of review--expressed in the "substantial evidence" doctrine-is
preserved. However, it is likely that despite sentiment favoring finality for administrative decisions that are fairly arrived at, courts which generally subscribe to this sentiment will overturn such decisions if their consequences appear
likely to be unjust. And it seems that courts should not be too severely criticized when they attempt to prevent obviously harsh operation of substantive
law. Rather, courts should not be forced by the unjust operation of substantive
law to ignore procedural rules.
3sIt is said that Congress can make "final" an administrative action which is within the
jurisdiction of the agency, but it may not usurp the constitutional power of the judiciary by
denying judicial determination of issues upon which administrative authority to act depends.
327 U.S. 114,
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(1946). In an earlier case, Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1044), which

involved a prosecution for violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of i94o, the
Court seemed to lean toward the "substantial evidence" rule by holding it improper to hear
evidence upon the propriety of the board's classification in absence of a provision in the Act for
such review. But this case was distinguished in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), on
the ground that Falbo had not exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking court intervention. Recently, Sunal v. Large, 67 S.Ct. I588 (1947), was decided adversely to the defendant for the same reason.
36Note Mr. Justice Frankfurter's special concurring opinion in Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114, 134-45 (1946).

